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Two questions are provoked by this case: (1) should a state court stay proceedings in an action in personam pending determination of a prior action
brought in a federal court between the same parties on substantially the same
cause of action? (2) should a federal court stay proceedings in such an action,
pending determination of a prior action brought in a state court? There is a
conflict in the holdings. The federal view, as expressed in several cases which
deny a stay of proceedings in the federal court pending determination of a prior
action in a state court, is that the matter is discretionary with the federal district court. City of Ironton, Ohio, v. Harrison Construction Co., 212 Fed. 353
(C.C.A. 6th, 1914); Southern Pacific Co. v. Klinge, 65 (2d) 85 (C.C.A. 10th,
1935). But in the case of Great North Woods Club v. Raymond, 54 F. (2d) 1017,
1018 (C.C.A. 6th, 1931), in which the federal district court stayed proceedings
peiding determination of a prior suit in a state court, the Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the stay order must be vacated. The court state: "Where a
federal court has jurisdiction of parties and of subject matter, it is usually true
that plaintiff in that court has an absolute right to have his case in that jurisdiction proceed to trial, and there is no discretion to stay that action, pending the
results of an earlier one in the state court." See also Checker Cab Mfg. Co. v.
Checker Taxi Co., 26 F. (2d) 752 (N.D. Ill. 1928). These decisions indicate that a
defendant has little opportunity to stay an action begun in federal court pending the determination of a prior suit in a state court. However, the majority
of state courts hold that the granting or refusal of a stay of proceedings begun
in the state court, pending the results of a prior action in federal court, is
discretionary with the state court. Curlette v. -Olds, 110 App. Div. 596, 97 N.Y.
Supp. 144 (1906); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Howington, 198 Ala. 311,
73 So. 550 (1916) ; State ex rel Milwaukee Lwmber Co. v. Superior Court, 147
Wash. 615, 266 Pac. 1054 (1928). In the Western Union case, the appellate court
would not set aside the lower court's determination to stay proceedings; in both
the Milwaukee Lumber Co. case, and the Curlette case the appellate court would
not disturb the lower tribunal's refusal to stay proceedings. The Wisconsin

Supreme Court, in the principal case, does not follow this rule of discretion.
In Wisconsin, a stay of proceedings where a prior action is set down for early
trial in a federal court, is not discretionary but mandatory on the trial court,
unless such action in the state court "is reasonably necessary for the protection
of some substantial right of a party." The principal case is the first definite
holding of our supreme court in this manner. The court discards the dicta of
the early case of Wood v. Lake, 13 Wis. 94 (1860), which stated that the Wisconsin courts need not abate proceedings pending the results of a suit between
the same parties on the same cause of action in a federal court. It is interesting
to trace the development of the Wisconsin doctrine from Wood v. Lake, through
Ashland v. Whitcomb, 120 Wis. 549, 98 N.W. 531 (1904), and Ashland v Wis.
Central Railway Co., 121 Wis. 646, 98 N.W. 532, 99 N.W. 431 (1904), to the
principal case.

PAUL G. NOELKE.
EVIDENCE-CRIMINAL PROSECUTION-SELF-CRIMINATIoN-The

defendant

was

prosecuted for driving an automobile on the public highways while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor. A physician testified in the case concerning the
results of a chemical analysis of the defendant's urine for ethyl alcohol content, a sample of which had been voluntarily furnished by the defendant.
The urinalysis interpreted according to a scientific standard disclosed the defend-
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RECENT DECISIONS

ant to have been "distinctly drunk" The defendant objected to the admission of
the testimony on the ground that he was compelled to give evidence against
himself in violation of the constitution of the state of Arizona which provides: "No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to give evidence
against himself." On an appeal by the State of Arizona from an order granting
the defendant a new trial, held, order vacated. Although the defendant may not
have known at the time why he was asked for a sample of urine, the defendant's
constitutional privilge against self-crimination was not violated and the physician's analysis was admissible. State v. Duguid, (Ariz. 1937) 72 P. (2d) 435.
The legal principle which protects a person from self-crimination is guaranteed by the federal Constitution, by forty-six state constitutions and by statute
in New Jersey and Iowa. However, it is agreed by the authorities that to violate the privilege necessitates testimonial compulsion. Thus, the tendency of
the modern cases is to open the door to the reception of all kinds of real evidence or proof of physical facts which speak for themselves like the urinalysis
in the principal case. Generally, the accepted practice has been to admit in evidence testimony as to the defendant's personal appearance, personal attire, and
physical characteristics as hair, eyes, complexion, marks, scars, height, weight,
footprints, fingerprints, stains and similar facts which are open to common observation. The question is how far these opportunities for observation
may be coerced and there are extreme cases in both directions. Thus in State v.
Ah Chuey, 14 Nev. 79, 33 Am. Rep. 530 (1879), where the identity of the
defendant was disputed, he was compelled to expose his arm to the jury to disclose tattoo marks. A compulsory showing of footprints was approved in State
v. Graham, 74 N.C. 646, 21 Am. Rep. 493 (1876) ; Walker v. State, 7 Tex. App.
245, 32 Am. Rep. 595 (1879) ; People v. Van Wormer, 175 N.Y. 188, 67 N.E. 299
(1903). The contrary rule is found in Day v. State, 63 Ga. 668 (1879) and Stokes
v. State, 5 Baxt. (Tenn.) 619, 30 Am. Rep. 72 (1875). A compulsory fingerprint
test was approved in People v. Sallow, 100 Misc. Rep. 447, 165 N.Y. Supp. 915
(1917). In Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 54 L.ed. 1021 (1910), where the
defendant was compelled to put on a blouse for identification, the court stated
that the prohibition against compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself refers to the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communications from him and not to the exclusion of his body as evidence
when it may be material. Obviously, if the contrary were true, we would have
the ridiculous situation of a jury being forbidden to look at the accused and
compare his features with a photograph or proof. The court further stated that
when the defendant is exhibited, whether voluntarily or by order, even though
the order goes too far, the evidence, if material is competent.
That the modern cases in fact are strictly confining the constitutional privilege to testimonial compulsion and opening the door wide as to evidence outside
the limitation may be seen from the following judicially approved cases regarded
beyond the pale of the constitutional prohibition: compelling the defendant
accused of murder to exhibit scars and to don a shirt found at the scene of the
crime and submit to inspection by the jury, State v. Oschoa, 49 Nev. 194, 242
Pac. 582 (1926); officers compelling the suspect to put on his cap before the
arrest, Crinshaw v. State, 225 Ala. 346, 142 So. 669 (1932) ; identifying accused
by placing a handkerchief over his face and compelling him to grow a beard,
Ross v. State, 204 Ind. 281, 182 N.E. 865 (1932); admitting evidence of reenactment of crime, People v. Fischer, 340 Ill. 216, 172 N.E. 743 (1930); compelling the defendant to put on an overcoat for purposes of identification,
Richardson v. State, 168 Miss. 788, 151 So. 910 (1934) ; introduction of photo-
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graphs of fingerprints of defendant, State v. Johnson, 111 W. Va. 653, 164 S.E.
31 (1932) ; compelling defendant against her will to submit to a medical examination in prosecution for driving while intoxicated, Noe v. Monmouth County
Common Pleas Court, 6 N.J. Misc. 1016, 143 At]. 750 (1928); forcibly taking
shoes from defendant for purpose of comparing footprints, Biggs v. State, 210
Ind. 200, 167 N.E. 129 (1929) and State v. Romero, 34 N.M. 494, 285 Pac. 497
(1930) ; admitting sound motion picture of defendant charged with manslaughter
making a voluntary confession to the police officials, People v. Hayes, (Cal.
1937) 71 P. (2d) 321. Compulsory reports under the hit and run driving laws
have been held constitutional as outside the privilege of self-crimination. State
v. Razey, 129 Kan. 328, 282 Pac. 755 (1930); People'v. Thompson, 259 Mich.
109, 242 N.W. 857 (1932); Ule v. State, 208 Ind. 255, 194 N.E. 140 (1935).
Contra: Rembrandt v. City of Cleveland, 28 Ohio. App. 4, 161 N.E. 364 (1928);
Janes v. City of Cleveland, 28 Ohio App. 178, 162 N.E. 617 (1928).
The leading case in Wisconsin, Thornton v. State, 117 Wis. 338, 93 N.W.
1107 (1903), lays down the rule that those portions of the person or attire which
are customarily open to observation are legitimate sources for testimony and
that it is not compelling a defendant to be a witness against himself by requiring
him to give witnesses, in court or out of court, an opportunity to make such
observation. Thus, the case holds that it was not error to compel the defendant
to deliver to witnesses his shoes for the purpose of comparing with them footprints found in the snow near the scene of the crime, and that testimony of such
comparison was admissible at the trial. Following the leading case, Rogers v.
State, 180 Wis. 568, 193 N.W. 612 (1923), held there was no error in receiving
testimony of a witness who positively identified the defendant after he had put
on certain clothes and a cap and sat in an automobile. Pollack v. State, 215 Wis.
200, 253 N.W. 560 (1934), held admissible photographs taken of defendants
with their knowledge in positions they indicated they occupied at the time of
the crime. Jessner v. State, 202 Wis. 184, 231 N.W. 634 (1930), upholds the
appointment of expert witnesses to examine a defendant pleading insanity as
not violating the defendant's constitutional rights against self-crimination. The
necessity of testimonial compulsion to violate the constitutional privilege is
brought out clearly in Ware v. State, 201 Wis. 425, 230 N.W. 80 (1930), which
holds that a diary surreptitiously obtained by the husband and proving the
guilt of the wife of adultery was admissible and did not compel the wife to
testify against herself. Relative to the attitude in the Wisconsin jurisdiction on
the matter of the urinalysis test mentioned in the principal case, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in State v. Bohner, 210 Wis. 651, 246 N.W. 314 (1933), holding
there was no error in excluding the testimony of an expert concerning the results
of a lie detector test, declared that the courts will go a long way in admitting
expert testimony providing the scientific principle or discovery upon which the
testimony is based has been sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs. The general trend appears to
be that scientific tests once accepted by the courts do not violate per se the
fundamental constitutional privilege against self-crimination and that the testimoney founded thereon, if material, is competent.
WILLiAM EDWARD TAY.

